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SECTION

1103

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTERNA
TIONAL, INC., AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF
"EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS"
INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century ended with a thriving economy,1 and for
the first time in United States history, average citizens were invest
ing in the stock market. 2 Instead of putting money into savings ac
counts, many were investing their money; they were saving for
homes, their children's college education, or their own retirement. 3
Then the corporate scandals hit, one after another-Enron,
World Com, Adelphia, and Tyco-and many in this new class of in
vestors lost their savings. 4
The scandals started in 2001, with EnronS hiding its losses and
deceiving investors. 6 In 2001, Enron "had a $618 million net loss
for the third quarter and would reduce shareholder equity by $1.2
billion."7 This had the greatest effect on investors, particularly En
ron employees, who had invested their savings in the company.8
Disturbingly, the corporate executives did not suffer nearly as much
from the stock's sudden downturn. 9 This was because corporate of
1. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923 (2003).
2. J. Brent Wilkins, Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Ef
fects of Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 339 (2005).
3. See id. (stating that the financial markets are now an important part of many
Americans' financial planning).
4. Id. at 339-40.
5. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357 (2003); Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron
and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Govern
ance and Disclosure Regimes, 37 CONN. L. REV. 725, 727 (2005).
6. Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty En
hancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2002).
7. Brickey, supra note 5, at 357; Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 726; David S. Ruder
et aI., The Securities and Exchange Commission's Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to
Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103,
1105 (2005).
8. Recine, supra note 6, at 1539; see John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities
Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 59 (2005) (stating
that the investors in Enron had no idea that this collapse was coming).
9. Kroger, supra note 8, at 59; Recine, supra note 6, at 1539-40.
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ficers prohibited regular employees from selling shares after Enron
had restated its earnings.l° Executives, however, were able to sell
their own shares during this blackout period. l l The executives' de
ception thus caused many honest, hardworking people to lose their
investments. 12 The corporate scandals that followed Enron added
to the financial losses of many middle-income investors.!3
These scandals resulted in a media storm, to which the govern
ment reacted quickly, passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in
2002.14 SOX is the most significant piece of securities legislation
since the 1930S15 and imposes new and stricter regulations on the
business community.16 Many sections of SOX impose greater liabil
ities on corporate officersP SOX also enables the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce stricter penalties against
corporate officers.ls One of these penalties permits the SEC to
temporarily freeze, in escrow, payments made to Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs).19
Section 1103 of SOX allows the SEC to obtain a court order to
temporarily freeze any "extraordinary payments" to be paid to cor
10. Recine, supra note 6, at 1539.
11. Id. at 1539-40.
12. See id. at 1539 ("Enron's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Kenneth Lay en
couraged employees to continue investing in Enron even as he was dumping his own
shares.").
13. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 923-25.
14. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corpo
rate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005).
15. Thomas O. Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in
Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley of2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135,137 (2004); see also President George
w. Bush, President's Ten-Point Plan, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
corporateresponsibility/index2.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) ("[T]he Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 [is] the most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the
time of Franklin D. Roosevelt.").
16. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.) (creating many different provisions within
securities law).
17. See Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 148 (stating the Act makes execu
tives responsible for protecting the company). Some examples include the obligation to
certify financial statements and to assume personal liability for incorrect statements.
Id. at 152.
18. See Joel M. Androphy & Thomas Graham, 2002: A Legal Perspective: Crimi
nal Law: White Collar Crime Update, 66 TEX. B.J. 66, 66-67 (2003) (listing the different
penalties enacted by SOX). One example of this is barring executives from serving on
the board of directors. 15 U.S.c. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 2004); Androphy & Graham,
supra.
19. 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2004); Androphy & Graham, supra note 18,
at 67.
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porate officers.2o Since the passage of SOX, the SEC has struggled
to define the phrase "extraordinary payments."21 Recently, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Gemstar- TV Guide International, Inc., interpreted the meaning of
"extraordinary payments."22 The majority, dissenting, and concur
ring opinions set out three different tests for interpreting the
phrase. 23 This Note agrees with the holding in Gemstar but argues
that the test that the majority uses in interpreting "extraordinary
payments" is not effective. The concurrence's test is more appro
priate because it would better enforce the purposes of SOX, make
the provision easy to administer, and help deter violations of securi
ties law.
This Note will analyze the Gemstar decision and discuss the
tests set out therein. Part I will provide background on SOX, in
cluding its passage, its purpose, and a description of section 1103.
Part II will discuss the history of the Gemstar case and the Ninth
Circuit's decision, as well as other cases interpreting "extraordinary
expenses" used in both the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Gemstar decision. Part III will analyze the three different tests for
interpreting "extraordinary payments." Part III will also argue that
providing a bright-line rule to evaluate "extraordinary payments" in
the context of severance packages is the best approach.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Securities Law Prior to SOX

The major role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is to act as an advocate for investors. 24 It is a small federal
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103,116 Stat. 745,
S07 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3)).
21. See Michelle Rice, Securities Enforcement: The Ninth Circuit Confines the
SEC's Enforcement Powers Under Section J 103 of Sarbanes-Ox[ey, INSIGHTS, June
2004, at 2, 4 (stating that the SEC is unclear about what defines an "extraordinary
payment").
22. See generally SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
23.

Jd.

24. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Main
tains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) [hereinafter "The Investor's Advocate"]' The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC. 15 V.S.c. § 7Sd(a) (2000). The SEC
includes a five-member commission, four divisions, and eighteen offices. [d.; THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.3, at 26-28 (4th ed. 2002) [here
inafter HAZEN 4th ed.]; The Investor's Advocate, supra. The five-member commission
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agency that oversees all aspects of the securities markets. 25 The
SEC gives effect to securities law through the enforcement of sev
eral different federal statutes,26 including the Securities Act of
1933,27 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,28 and the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002.29
B.

Enactment and Purpose of sox
1.

Road to SOX

The thriving economy of the 1990s caused a rise in the stock
market and drew in many new investors. 3o Around the turn of the
century, however, corporate scandals started to surface, one after
is appointed by the President. 15 U.S.c. § 78d(a); HAZEN 4th ed., supra, at 26-27; The
Investor's Advocate, supra.
25. HAZEN 4th ed., supra note 24, at 22; Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Speech
by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud
Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm.
While the SEC is a small agency, it serves many important functions. These include:
"Protect[ing] Investors," "Maintain[ing] Fair, Honest, and Efficient Markets," "Facili
tate[ing] Capital Formation," and "Sustain[ing] and Improv[ing] Organizational Excel
lence." SEC, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA), 2004
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN AND 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 16 (2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004_2002.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE].
26. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra note 25, at 9-10; The Investor's Advo
cate, supra note 24.
27. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that companies register their securities
with the SEC, and mandates that the information provided during the registration pro
cess be accurate. 15 U.S.c. § 77(f) (2000); HAZEN 4th ed., supra note 24, at 2l.
28. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC and requires corpora
tions to file regular reports. 15 U.S.c. § 78(d) (2000); The Investor's Advocate, supra
note 24. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also prohibits insider trading, and re
quires "a variety of market participants to register with the commission." SEC, The
Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last vis
ited Jan. 2, 2007); 15 U.S.c. §§ 780, 78p (2000); see also The Investor's Advocate, supra
note 24.
29. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 24; GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra
note 25, at 9-10. The SEC also uses the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Invest
ment Advisors Act of 1940 to reach these goals. The Investor's Advocate, supra note
24; GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra note 25, at 10.
30. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Implementa
tion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept. 9, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter "Testimony Concerning Implementation"];
Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40 (stating that the 1990s brought a lot of new investors
into the stock market). Historically, only the wealthiest people invested in the stock
market; however, in the 1990s many "ordinary people" started to use the stock market
as a tool to save for retirement, or to grow their savings. Id. In the past two decades,
the percentage of U.S. households investing in the stock market has grown from 20 to
50 percent. Id.; see also Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the
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another, and the financial markets began to fall.3 1 Between March
2000 and September 2002, the falling stock markets caused an $8.5
trillion drop in investors' net worth. 32 In response to the failing
markets and corporate scandals, Congress passed SOX. 33
The growing stock market of the 1990s created an environment
that pressured companies to meet or exceed their goals every quar
ter. 34 However, corporations were not the only entities to blame
for the environment that contributed to the corporate scandals. 35
Due to insufficient funding, the SEC did not have the financial re
sources to investigate many of the potential scandals. 36 Therefore,
the pressures felt by companies in the 1990s, along with the weak
ness of the SEC, provided the opportune climate for corporate mis
behavior, and the resulting corporate scandals pushed the problems
of corporate governance to the forefront.
Between November 2001 and June 2002, Enron, Global Cross
ing, Adelphia, and World Com all filed for bankruptcyY Because
the number of stock market investors had grown, these scandals
had a significant impact on the voting behavior of many Ameri
cans. 38 This led politicians to act quickly.39 The mid-term elections
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 127, 132 (2002); Cunningham,
supra note 1, at 923-24.
31. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 924-27.
32. Aronson, supra note 30, at 127.
33. [d. at 128; Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, SEC, SEC Speech: SEC Initiatives
Under Sarbanes-Oxley and Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022603cag.htm.
34. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. This compelled exec
utives, auditors, and accountants to "stretch" the numbers. [d. A major problem dur
ing this period was the dilemma of an investment banking securities analyst. Aronson,
supra note 30, at 131. Investment banks often won big underwriting contracts by giving
good analyst reports. [d. Therefore, in order to get big contracts, many analysts never
recommended selling securities. [d. Also, there are reports that some analysts recom
mended the stocks of the companies affected by the scandals-even as the companies
were falling apart. Glassman, supra note 33.
35. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32. This Note does not mean to suggest that a
majority of corporate executives engage in unlawful conduct. Indeed, "the vast major
ity of American businessmen and women are enterprising, honest and hardworking."
Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation: Capitol Hill Hearing, FED.
NEWS SERVICE (July 24, 2002), available at LEXIS; GENFED; FEDNEW (statement of
Rep. Michael Oxley) [hereinafter Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legis
lation]. Moreover, "[n]obody should assume that because there have been a very small
number of people who had been irresponsible that this represents the American free
enterprise system." [d. (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski).
36. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32.
37. Recine, supra note 6, at 1537. These were four of the largest bankruptcies in
American history. [d.
38. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40.
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of 2002 were around the corner, and the media attention that sur
rounded the corporate scandals virtually guaranteed the Act's pas
sage. 40 Indeed, SOX was passed with little debate or opposition. 41
While SOX was passed in haste, and with little debate, it was
not the first response to the growing problem of corporate govern
ance. Before SOX, President George W. Bush had proposed what
he described as a ten-point plan. 42 The President's ten-point plan
was focused on the investor and on correcting corporate govern
ance problems. 43 However, the President's plan received criticism
from Republicans and Democrats alike, who claimed that the plan
lacked sufficient "teeth" to deter corporate wrongdoers. 44 Con
gress was looking for a solution that would make corporate officers
accountable. 45
Congress found its solution in SOX. SOX was passed "virtu
39. Id. at 343.
40. Romano, supra note 14, at 1523-24.
41. Id. at 1528. In fact, even Republicans in Congress, who tend to lean more
toward business freedom, did not oppose the bill. Id. They were afraid of what opposi
tion to this Act could do to their careers. Id.; see also Wilkins, supra note 2, at 343
(stating that SOX was passed in haste).
42. Recine, supra note 6, at 1545-46; Bush, supra note 15.
43. Bush, supra note 15. The ten points of the plan were:
(1) Each investor should have quarterly access to the information needed to
judge a firm's financial performance, condition, and risks.
(2) Each investor should have prompt access to critical information.
(3) CEOs should personally vouch for the veracity, timeliness, and fairness
of their companies' public disclosures, including their financial
statements.
(4) CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to profit from erroneous
financial statements.
(5) CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose their
right to serve in any corporate leadership positions.
(6) Corporate leaders should be required to tell the public promptly when
ever they buy or sell company stock for personal gain.
(7) Investors should have complete confidence in the independence and in
tegrity of companies' auditors.
(8) An independent regulatory board should ensure that the accounting pro
fession is held to the highest ethical standards.
(9) The authors of accounting standards must be responsive to the needs of
investors.
(10) Firms' accounting systems should be compared with best practices, not
simply against minimum standards.
Id.
44. Recine, supra note 6, at 1545-46. Part of the problem with the President's
plan was the absence of any increased criminal penalties. Id. at 1548.
45. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35
(statement of Rep. Michael Oxley) (stating that "corporate executives who break the
law and abuse the public trust [must] pay severely").
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ally unanimously" by Congress,46 and has minimal clarifying legisla
tive history.47 This led to criticism that SOX was not well thought
out, and that the lack of debate would lead to problematic legisla
tion.48 In fact, Republican Senator Phil Gramm, "who reversed his
opposition to the bill, acknowledged that given the environment,
'literally anything could have passed."'49 Consequently, due to
pressure from the corporate scandals and the surrounding media
attention, SOX passed with little opposition.
2.
a.

Purpose and Goals

Investor confidence

After the corporate scandals, there was wide recognition that
something had gone wrong in corporate America; as a result, many
investors lost confidence in the failing markets. 50 While investors
had been able to shrug off the earlier failures of the dot-com com
panies, it was harder to ignore the failures of larger, more estab
lished corporations. 51 Investor confidence had been shaken, and it
was clear that in order to return investors to the market, something
had to be done to restore their confidence. 52 The main goals of
SOX, therefore, were to restore investor confidence and protect in
vestors from future corporate scandals. 53
46. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 343. The roll call vote in the House of Representa
tives shows that there were 423 yeas, 3 nays, and 8 not voting. 148 CONGo REC. H5462,
M5480 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). The Senate vote on the conference report was 99-0.
148 CONGo REC. S7350 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
47. Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 141-42.
48. Romano, supra note 14, at 1528-29. Critics of the Act argue that, due to the
Act's quick passage, a law was created that is disorganized and unnecessary. Michael
A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 672-74 (2002).
49. Recine, supra note 6, at 1548-49 (quoting Marcy Gordon, Bush Receives Cor
porate Reform Bill, Congress Gives Measure Easy O.K., CHI. TRIB., July 26, 2002, at
11).
50. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
51. Aronson, supra note 30, at 128.
52. Glassman, supra note 33.
53. Id. The SEC expects to reach these goals by improving corporate governance
through SOX. Aulana Peters, Goodwin Seminar: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Con
gress' Response to Corporate Scandals: Will the New Rules Guarantee "Good" Govern
ance and Avoid Future Scandals?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 283, 284-85 (2004). However,
critics of the Act doubt SOX will improve corporate governance, and claim that these
new proviSions will not change anything. Id. In fact, Enron's corporate governance
plan would have satisfied the requirements of SOX. Id.
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Corporate accountability and deterrence

SOX regulates many different aspects of corporate lawY In
many of its provisions, SOX creates disclosure requirements that
are new to securities regulation. 55 Some portions of the Act that
help to ensure corporate accountability and deterrence are the code
of ethics provision,56 the requirement that executives certify com
pany reports,57 and the decreased standard for director removal,58
All of the provisions take positive steps to help deter corporate mis
behavior and provide a foundation for the SEC to promote disclo
sure and to work with corporations to help ensure that investors are
protected from wrongdoing. 59
54. Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and
Their Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 NOVA L. REV. 605, 626-29 (2004).
SOX regulates, among other things, CEO and CFO certifications, loans to directors and
executive officers, whistleblower protection, forfeiture of bonus and share trading prof
its, audit committees, "Real Time" disclosure, internal controls disclosure, pro forma
financial information, extension of statutes of limitations, auditor oversight, and auditor
independence and rotation. Id.
55. Aronson, supra note 30, at 139, 148-50.
56. 15 U.S.c. § 7264 (Supp. IV 2004). Section 406 of SOX provides that the SEC
will make rules which require the public to be informed about a company's Code of
Ethics. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.7(2) (5th ed.
2005) [hereinafter HAZEN 5th ed.]. The purpose of this provision, and the rules
adopted by the SEC pursuant to the Act, is to promote "honest and ethical conduct."
Id.; 15 U.S.c. § 7264(c). As part of "honest and ethical" conduct, a company's code of
ethics must include how a company would handle a conflict of interest, and must also
encourage full disclosure of the company's SEC filings. Id.; HAZEN 5th ed., supra, at
§ 9.7(2).
57. 15 U.S.c. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004); Testimony Concerning Implementation,
supra note 30.
58. Androphy & Graham, supra note 18, at 67. Previously, the standard required
a potential board member be "substantially unfit"; today, the SEC only needs to prove
that an individual is "unfit," thus lowering the standard. Id.; see also 15 U.S.c.
§§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). Previously, the SEC needed a court order to bar
an officer; now the SEC is able to bar officers without a court order. Philip F.S. Berg,
Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People from Serving as Officers and Directors of
Publicly Traded Companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1887
(2003). This provision has already had an impact on the way the SEC pursues corpo
rate wrongdoers. In 2001, the SEC only sought to bar fifty-one officers from the board
room; this figure increased to about 300 officers a year by 2004. Stephen M. Cutler, The
Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Ref/ected in the Commission's Enforcement Program, IN
SIGHTS, June 2004, at 18, 22. In fact, the SEC pursued a permanent bar of Gemstar's
CEO when it filed charges against Gemstar. Press Release, SEC, SEC Sues Former
CEO and CFO of Gemstar-TV Guide for Financial Fraud Scheme (June 19, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-75.htm. The SEC succeeded in barring
Gemstar's CEO from the boardroom. SEC v. Yuen, No. CV-03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34759, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2006).
59. Two other provisions of SOX worth mentioning, because they are examples of
an increased duty for executives to disclose, are: the requirement of insider transaction
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Extraordinary Payments: Section 1103

In order to help enforce the Act and to deter potential viola
tors, SOX also contains provisions that give the SEC tools to punish
corporate wrongdoers, and compensate harmed investors. 6o One of
these tools is section 1103.61 The SEC can use section 1103 to put
into escrow any "extraordinary payments" made to CEOs and
CFOs while the SEC is investigating possible securities violations. 62
If violations of SOX are found, the SEC can use the escrowed
money to compensate investors. 63
1.

Section 1103

Section 1103 amends section 21C(c) of the 1934 Securities Ex
change Act. 64 Section 1l03(a) provides the SEC with the power to
issue a temporary escrow order:
Whenever during the course of a lawful investigation involving
possible violations of the Federal Securities Laws by an issuer of
publicly traded securities or any of its directors, officers, partners,
controlling persons, agents, or employees, it shall appear to the
Commission that it is likely that the issuer will make extraordi
nary payments (whether compensatory or otherwise) to any of
the foregoing persons, the Commission may petition a Federal
District Court for a temporary order requiring the issuer to es
crow, subject to court supervision, those payments in an interest
bearing account for 45 days.65

The remainder of section 1103 provides that the freeze bedisclosures, and the prohibition on insider trading during pension blackouts. 15 U.S.c.
§§ 7Sp, 7244 (Supp. IV 2004); Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.

The disclosure of insider transactions provides for earlier public notification of when
securities have been traded by insiders. 15 U.S.c. § 7Sp(2); Testimony Concerning Im
plementation, supra note 30. The prohibition on insider trading during pension black
outs attempts to equalize the playing field among employees and executives in the sale
of stock by preventing corporate officers from selling their stock when the corporation
has imposed a pension blackout for the rest of the employees in the company. 15
U.S.c. § 7244(1); Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
60. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103(a), 116 Stat.
745, S07-0S (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2004»; Testimony
Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103(a); 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3). This provi
sion is not only for "extraordinary payments" paid out to CEOs and CFOs but also
payments made to "directors, officers, partners, controlling persons, agents, or employ
ees." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103(a); 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i).
63. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103.
65. [d. § 1l03(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i».
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comes effective immediately, and is only effective for 45 days, un
less the court grants an extension for another 45 days.66 There is
also an exception: if charges are filed before the end of the period
for which payments are frozen, then the freeze will stay in effect
until the conclusion of the legal proceedings.67 If the executive is
not charged with a violation of securities law within the freeze pe
riod, the money is returned to the executive. 68
2.

History and Purpose

According to Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, "top execu
tives will not be allowed to pilfer assets of the company by giving
themselves huge bonuses and other extraordinary payments if the
company is subject to an SEC investigation. "69 The legislative his
tory on section 1103 demonstrates that Congress's intent in passing
this section was to prevent executives from benefiting from their
own misconduct.7° As Senator Trent Lott stated, the purpose of
this provision was to "ensur[e] that corporate assets are not improp
erly taken for an executive's personal benefit."71
Prior to the passage of section 1103, the SEC had been able to
freeze payments, but only after it had filed charges for a securities
violation.7 2 The new provision allows the SEC to get a court order
to freeze payments any time after it has commenced an investiga
tion, thereby avoiding the possibility that corporate officers will
plunder corporate assets before the SEC has enough evidence to
66.
67.

Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(iii) to (iv)).
Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(B)(i)).
68. Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(B)(ii)).
69. 148 CONGo REC. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002). This coincides with a
theme present throughout the Act: to aggressively pursue CEOs and CFOs who have
committed wrongdoing. Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After Directors Who Ignore Fraud;
Case Against Former Outside Board Member of Firm Will Be Model, CHI. SUN, Aug. 21,
2004, at 51.
70. 148 CONGo REC. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); 148 CONGo REC. S6524,
6545 (daily ed. July 10,2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott).
71. 148 CONGo REC. S6524, 6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
72. Wesley Bowen Gilchrist, Turning Up the Heat: The SEC's New Temporary
Freeze Authority, 56 ALA. L. REV. 873,881 (2005). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
standard for freezing assets was much stricter than the standard under the Sarbanes
Oxley Act. See Rice, supra note 21, at 2. Under the 1934 Act, the commission needed
to prove that "a legitimate concern exist[ed]," and that if the assets were not frozen, the
assets would disappear. /d. Also, the court was required to consider several factors,
including whether the freeze would interfere with a company's business, whether the
freeze was "narrowly tailored," the effect on the defendant, and whether the amount
was more than the SEC could recover. Id. In contrast, the new provision requires only
that "it 'appears to the commission' that an 'extraordinary payment' is likely to be made
by an issuer." Id. at 3.
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officially file charges. 73
Interestingly, the temporary freeze authority was initially pro
posed by President Bush in July of 2002 as part of his corporate
responsibility initiative.74 However, this freeze authority was not
originally part of SOX. 75 Senator Trent Lott introduced the provi
sion as an amendment, which passed unanimously.76 Its purpose is
to use corporate officers' golden parachutes to reimburse investors
after the corporate officers have committed corporate
wrongdoing. 77
The new SEC power was designed to increase investor confi
dence. 78 Congress's purpose was to prevent executives from bene
fiting from misconduct while investors lose money.79 While this
provision can help the SEC restore investor confidence, there re
mains the question of what Congress meant by "extraordinary pay
ments" as used in section 1103.80 Although the SEC has the ability
to define this phrase, it has not done SO.81 The courts have been left
to interpret what Congress meant by "extraordinary payments,"
and this is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did in Gemstar. 82
II.
A.

SEC v.

GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Procedural History

The Gemstar case arose when the SEC placed the termination
packages of the CEO and the CFO of Gemstar-T.V. Guide Interna
tional, Inc. into escrow. 83 The district court granted the SEC's ap
73. [d.; see also Rice, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that the purpose of section 1103
was to stop executives from taking money from their own corporations).
74. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 880; see also Press Release, The White House, A
New Ethic of Corporate Responsibility (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709.html.

75.

Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 881.

76.

[d.

77. Pitt, supra note 25; Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30;
Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 875.
78. "This 'preventive measure' helps to address one of the toughest challenges
facing the Commission-finding, recovering, and returning funds to defrauded inves
tors-by securing funds before they are provided to alleged securities-law violators."
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
79. 148 CONGo REc. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002).
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103(a), 116 Stat.
745,807-08 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004».
81. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005).
82.

[d.

83. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., No. CV 03-3124, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8707 (C.O. Cal. 2003), affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416
(2005).
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plication in accordance with section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 84 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's rul
ing due to a lack of evidence establishing that the payments were
"extraordinary."85 The judgment was subsequently vacated and re
manded. 86 Later, the Ninth Circuit ordered the case re-heard en
banc. 87 The en bane hearing led to the reversal of the original
Ninth Circuit ruling. 88 The court concluded that the payments were
"extraordinary payments." The result of the original dissenting
opinion became the result of the majority opinion, and the result of
the original majority opinion became the result of the dissenting
opinion. 89
B.

The Gemstar Case
1.

The Facts of the Case

In April 2002, Gemstar filed its lO-K report for 2001. 90 The
report stated $107.6 million in revenue that had not been realized. 91
In August 2002, Gemstar filed a Form 8-K92 announcing that it had
overstated revenue by $20 million and that the company was going
to restate its financial results for 2001, reversing the $20 million fig
ure. 93 Gemstar also announced that Dr. Henry Yuen, the, Chief Ex
ecutive Officer, and Elsie Leung, the Chief Financial Officer, would
not be able to certify that Gemstar's financial statements were accu
84. Id. at *1.
85. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004),
reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
86. Id.
87. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct.
affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
88. See SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'!, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (af
firming the district court's ruling), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
89. See id.
90. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036. A lO-K report is a report that publicly traded
companies must file with the SEC annually. The report gives an overview that includes
the audited financial statements of the company and the company's business and finan
cial information. SEC, lO-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last visited Jan.
2, 2007); see also SEC v. Yuen, No. CV 03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *18
(CD. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006).
91. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036. This announcement caused Gemstar's stock to
drop by 37 percent. Id.
92. An 8-K report is a report that a company must file to announce an event of
which the stockholders must be informed. SEC, 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form
8k.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007); see also Yuen, No. CV 03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33938, at *18.
93. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036.
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rate, as required by SOX. 94 Then in September 2002, another Form
8-K was filed:
(1) confirming that [the corporation] had been notified by NAS
DAQ that its securities were subject to delisting for failure timely
to file a Form lO-Q for the quarter ending on June 30, 2002; (2)
that because of an unresolved dispute between Gemstar and its
independent auditor KPMG, the company could not file its quar
terly Form 10-Q report; and (3) that the resolution of these ac
counting and financial statements was "uncertain" and
"unpredictable. "95

After these events, it was obvious that Gemstar was in trouble, and
that something had gone wrong within the company.96
It then became clear that Yuen and Leung might have had ad
vance knowledge of the company's financial problems. Yuen had
sold seven million shares of Gemstar stock only four days before
Gemstar announced its overstatement of revenue. 97 Also, while
Gemstar was falling apart, both Yuen and Leung were "cutting a
new deal with Gemstar's Board to 'resign' from their respective ex
ecutive positions," yet remain as employees in other capacities. 98
These attempts included negotiations for monetary compensation. 99
Yuen's package included over $29 million in cash and more than 5
million shares of restricted stock, and Leung's package included
$8.16 million in cash, the right to purchase 1.1 million shares of
common stock, and 353,680 shares of restricted stock or stock op
tions. lOo The SEC then commenced an investigation into Gemstar's
revenue misstatements. 101
Once the investigation was underway, the SEC asked both
94.
95.

[d. at 1037.
[d. A lO-Q report is similar to a lO-K report, but is filed quarterly, instead of

annually. The report includes the company's financials and unedited financial state
ments. The report is filed for each of the first three quarters of the year. lO-Q, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/forml0q.htm(lastvisitedJan.2.2007);seealsoYuen.No.CV 03
4376,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *18.
96. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1037.
97.
98.

[d.
[d. It should be noted that while the court did use the term "resign" to de

scribe the negotiations between Yuen, Leung, and the Gemstar board, the court did
place the term in quotation marks, suggesting that Yuen and Leung were at the very
least being asked to resign, if not being forced to. See id.
99. [d.
100. [d. The packages were reported by Gemstar in an 8-K filing in November
2002. [d.
101. [d.
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Yuen and Leung to put their termination payments into escrow.1 02
Both initially declined to do so, but Gemstar informed them that
the payments would be held in escrow for six months. 103 One day
before the expiration of the six-month escrow period, the SEC peti
tioned to freeze Yuen and Leung's payments pursuant to section
1103 of SOX. 104 Thus, the issue for the court was whether these
payments were "extraordinary" within the context of section 1103.
2.

Three Approaches to Defining "Extraordinary
Payments"

The three opinions of the Ninth Circuit in the Gemstar case
the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent-all proposed differ
ent tests for deciding when a payment is an "extraordinary pay
ment." The majority implemented a multi-factor test to determine
the definition of an "extraordinary" payment. The dissent sug
gested an industry comparison test, and the concurrence suggested
a bright-line rule.
a.

The majority approach: out of the ordinary

The Gemstar majority first decided that "extraordinary" means
"out of the ordinary," and that "out of the ordinary" means "a pay
ment that would not typically be made by a company in its custom
ary course of business.''105 The court then determined the test
should be "a fact based and flexible inquiry."lo6 Previously, the dis
trict court had looked at "[c]ontext-specific factors such as the cir
cumstances under which the payment is contemplated or made, the
purpose of the payment, and the size of the payment," and the
Ninth Circuit agreed that these factors might be used to help decide
whether a payment is "extraordinary."107 However, the court re
jected the idea that there must be a nexus between the alleged mis
conduct and the payment in order for the SEC to temporarily
102. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2004),
reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. affd, '401 F.3d 1031 (9th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005); 2 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 32:10
(Thomson West 2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR].
103. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089; EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 102,
§ 32:10.
104. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089-90; Rice, supra note 21, at 4.
105. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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freeze the payments. 108 A nexus may be used to show that the pay
ment was "extraordinary," but is not a requirement. 109 Addition
ally, the court stated that "deviation from an 'industry standard'
or the practice of similarly situated businesses-might also reveal
whether a payment is extraordinary."110
Even though the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion provided
some factors to use in deciding if a payment is "extraordinary," it
stressed that "the statute does not compel any specific method of
making the determination but allows for the consideration of a vari
ety of factors, as the situation may warrant."111 The majority fo
cused on the size of the payments at issue as compared to an
executive's usual salary, and on the fact that the termination pay
ments were different than those provided for in an officer's employ
ment contract. 1l2 According to the court, the termination packages
of Yuen and Leung were "not business as usual."113

b.

The dissenting approach: industry comparison

The dissenting judge, Carlos T. Bea, suggested that the stan
dard for determining "extraordinary payments" should require the
SEC to "present evidence that a payment was extraordinary rela
tive to payments made by other comparable companies, under cir
cumstances which have not resulted in an investigation by securities
agencies, but which are otherwise comparable."114 He then sug
gested two factors that could be used to identify a comparable com
pany.l1S These factors were: (1) "size," and (2) "the industry or
market in which they do business."116 The judge also set out three
factors that might be used to show "comparable circumstances."117
These factors included: (1) "the position of those whose employ
ment is being terminated," (2) "the length of their tenure," and (3)
"the reason their employment was terminated."118
108. Id. The court did not define "nexus," but used "nexus" and "connection"
interchangeably. See id.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. Therefore, the appeals court concluded that the district court was correct

in refusing to set out a specific test to determine whether the payments made to Yuen
and Leung were "extraordinary payments." Id. at 1045-46.
112. Id. at 1046.
113.
114.
115.
116.

117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1056.
/d.
Id.
Id.
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The dissent argued that the majority erred in two ways.119
First, the majority interpreted" 'extraordinary payments' to mean
'payments under extraordinary circumstances."'120 Second, by cre
ating a test that is not based on a comparison to other companies,
but is based on a comparison to the company making the payment
"any payment made under any situation novel to that company is
now subject to escrow."121 Judge Bea also suggested that the ma
jority had confused its own standard by claiming that in some cir
cumstances comparison to other industries may be appropriate, but
in other circumstances it is not appropriate. 122 The majority opin
ion does not explain which circumstances require the application of
which standard. 123
According to Judge Bea, a comparison-based test would be
more workable for the district courts to apply.124 Consequently, be
cause the SEC did not offer any proof that the payments to Yuen
and Leung were not similar to other comparable companies' termi
nation packages, Judge Bea opined that the district court's ruling
should be reversed. 125
c.

The concurring approach: a bright-line rule

The concurring opinion by Judge Reinhardt agreed that the
payments to Yuen and Leung were "extraordinary," but did not
agree with the test the majority opinion created to make that deter
mination. 126 Judge Reinhardt would have held "that all severance
packages due top corporate officers and officials, and any other
substantial non-routine payments to which they may be entitled,
constitute 'extraordinary payments' that the district court may or
der placed in escrow temporarily."127 He noted that the purpose of
the Act was to temporarily freeze payments not usually made in the
"ordinary course of business," and since severance payments are
never made in the "ordinary course of business," they should al
119. Id. at 1051.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. ld. at 1056-57. The dissenting judge also argued that district courts have
more experience applying the analysis set forth in the dissent's test than they do the one
set out in the majority's test. Id.
125. Id. at 1057-58.
126. Id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
127. Id.
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ways be considered "extraordinary payments."128
Judge Reinhardt argued the importance of a bright-line rule in
order to facilitate an SEC investigation. 129 He also stated that the
factors the majority relied on in deciding whether a payment is "ex
traordinary" do not suit the purpose of the Act. 130 He believed
that, regardless of the circumstances, payments made outside of the
ordinary course of business should be considered "extraordinary,"
because that would serve the purpose of the Act. 131
3.

Extraordinary Expenses

Both the majority and dissenting opinions referred to three
prior Ninth Circuit cases which have interpreted the phrase "ex
traordinary expenses."132 The majority used these cases to show
that the courts used comparable reasoning in the past to interpret a
phrase similar to "extraordinary payments."133 However, the dis
sent stated that the "extraordinary expense" cases did not apply be
cause in those cases the court had either misinterpreted the
reasoning in the case, or "the governing statute or rule of law" 134
128. Id. at 1049.
129. Id. Judge Reinhardt explained that the SEC is in the early part of its investi
gation when trying to place these payments into escrow, and therefore, does not have
much relevant information. Id. (citing Floor Statement of Rep. Baker, 148 CONGo REC.
H4683-01 (daily ed. July 16, 2002». Consequently, using a bright-line rule to place
these payments into escrow would help the SEC speed up their investigation.
130. Id. at 1050. Judge Reinhardt argued that it is possible for payments to be
"extraordinary," even if the payments are comparable to the officer's salary, if there
would not be adequate funds "to provide for disgorgement should the allegations prove
true." Id.
131. Id. Judge Reinhardt pointed out that the majority agreed with him as to the
purpose of the Act, that is, "to prevent wrongdoers from depleting the corporate trea
sury and to ensure that there are adequate funds to provide for disgorgement should
the allegations of fraud prove to be true," and stated that the only way to conform to
the purpose of the Act is to declare that all severance packages are "extraordinary
payments." Id.
132. Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1996); Sousa v. Miguel, 32
F.3d 1370 (9th CiT. 1994); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, Int'l Bhd. of Team
sters, 623 F.2d 1354 (9th CiT. 1980).
133. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045 n.2 (majority opinion).
134. The statutes and rule of law that the dissenting judge referred to are in Sousa
and Frito-Lay, Inc. Sousa, 32 F.3d 1370; Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d 1354. In Sousa v.
Miguel, the court relied on 11 U.S.c. § 330(a)(2) (2000). Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1377. The
court interpreted this section to mean that "trustees are not entitled to reimbursement
for normal overhead expenses under § 330(a)(2)." Id. For the rule of law, the dissent
ing judge referred to Frito-Lay, Inc., which cited to many different cases where "ex
traordinary expenses, not normal to [the company's own] business operation" had been
awarded. See Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365 n.11 (citing Mason-Rust v. Laborers'
Int'l Union, Local 42, 435 F.2d 939, 947 (8th Cir. 1970); Abbott v. Local 142, Journey
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explicitly required a comparison of the "extraordinary expenses"
and "the company's past practices."135
In Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, International Broth
erhood of Teamsters, 136 the Ninth Circuit looked to the day-to-day
operations of the business in examining a particular payment.
Frito-Lay sued the Union, stating that the Union had forced Frito
Lay into negotiating collectively with other like companies in order
to obtain a contract for its workers. 137 The court found the union
liable, and interpreted "extraordinary expenses" when calculating
damages. 138 The court defined "extraordinary expenses" as ex
penses that are "not normal to its business operation, [and] in
curred as a result of the Union's illegal strike."139 Similarly, in both
Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC140 and Sousa v. Miguel,141 the court de
fined "extraordinary expenses" as expenses that were not part of
the day-to-day expenses of that particular business.
The holdings in the three cases cited above are clear: "ex
traordinary expenses" are expenses that are not part of every-day
men & Apprentices of the Pipefitting Indus., 429 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1970); Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co., 384 F.2d 101, 109 (5th Cir. 1967); Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 303 F.2d 39, 46 (6th Cir. 1962); Engineers v. Dahlem
Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1951); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steel
Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 316 F. Supp. 509, 525 (N.D. Ala. 1969».
135. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1055 n.3 (Bea, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that
the majority misread Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC. Id. The dissenting judge stated that the
Atlanta-One court did not compare the "extraordinary expense" to the day-to-day ex
penses of the business, "but to what the 'reasonable' broker might charge." Id.
136. Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d 1354.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1362.
139. Id. at 1365 n.l1.
140. Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1996). In Atlanta-One, the
SEC brought an action against Atlanta-One, a brokerage firm, for charging customers
unfair commissions. Id. at 106. The brokers claimed that because they incurred high
expenses, the commissions were justified. Id. at 107. The court looked to the com
pany's daily expenses to see if they had incurred "extraordinary expenses." Id. By
looking only at the company's past expenses, the court decided that the company had
not incurred "extraordinary expenses." Id. at 107-08. The court also stated that even if
the company had incurred "extraordinary expenses," it would not have been allowed to
pass them on to customers through high commissions. Id. at 108.
141. Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994). In Sousa, the court held that a
trustee in a bankruptcy case can only be reimbursed for office expenses that are "ex
traordinary." Id. at 1376-77. The court interpreted the relevant statute, 11 U.S.c.
§ 330, to mean that the trustee could not be reimbursed for "normal [overhead] ex
penses" but only for "extraordinary expenses." Id. at 1377; see supra note 134. The
court defined "extraordinary expenses" to mean "expenses incurred in the administra
tion of a specific estate, not what they generally spend running their office." Sousa, 32
F.3d at 1376-77.
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business operations. However, two of the approaches advocated in
Gemstar disagree with this interpretation of "extraordinary," and
take unworkable positions. The one workable approach, which is
also true to the court's past interpretation of "extraordinary," is
that of the concurring opinion. While the holding in the Gemstar
case is correct, the majority did not fully consider the purpose be
hind SOX in its interpretation of "extraordinary payments." In
contrast, the concurring approach took the purpose of the Act into
consideration and therefore, it is the approach courts should use
when determining whether a payment is "extraordinary."142
III.

ANALYSIS

The purpose of section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to
provide a mechanism for the SEC to withhold funds from potential
corporate wrongdoers in order to reimburse investors for violations
of securities law. 143 This provision has the potential to strengthen
both the effect of SOX and the power of the SEC. I44 Conse
quently, it is important that the SEC be able to use section 1103
effectively. The concurring opinion in the Gemstar case allows this
by providing an easy-to-apply bright-line rule that all severance
payments are "extraordinary payments."145

A.

An Effective Test for Section 1103 is Necessary

The purpose of SOX is clear: to increase investor confidence in
corporate America amidst failing corporate governance systems. 146
However, the role of section 1103 is unclear. Section 1103 states
that the SEC can petition the district court for an order placing the
142. Litigation subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's re-hearing resulted in Yuen and
Lueng's payments being placed into escrow, and Yuen being found guilty of securities
fraud, for violating "the periodic reporting, record keeping, and internal control re
quirements," and making misrepresentations to auditors. SEC v. Yuen, No. CV 03
4376,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *98, *114, *121 (CD. Cal. Mar. 16,2006). After
Yuen was found guilty of these violations, an additional hearing was held on the issue of
remedies. See SEC v. Yuen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34759 (CD. Cal. May 8, 2006).
After the hearing on remedies, the court entered a "Final Judgment Imposing Perma
nent Injunction, Disgorgement, Prejudgment Interest, Civil Penalty, and Permanent Of
ficer and Director Bar Against Defendant Henry C Yuen." [d. at *4.
143. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
144. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30; see also Conference
Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Tim
Johnson) (stating that this legislation would strengthen the SEC).
145. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
146. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
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payments into escrow if it "appears to the Commission that it is
likely that the issuer will make extraordinary payments (whether
compensation or otherwise)."147 This language does not give a
"substantive standard that the SEC must meet in order to obtain an
asset freeze."148 Consequently, the Act itself does not provide a
test that the SEC can use to implement section 1103.
The importance of having an effective test might easily be
overlooked because during an SEC investigation it will usually ben
efit a corporation to cooperate with the SEC and agree to put pay
ments into escrow.149 This is illustrated by the Gemstar case.
Gemstar did not oppose putting both Yuen's and Leung's payments
into escrow. 150 Instead, it was Yuen and Leung, individually, who
brought suit against the SEC to keep their severance packages out
of escrow.151 Therefore, having an effective test is important be
cause of the likelihood of litigation; even if a corporation does not
oppose putting a severance payment into escrow, the executive will
most likely oppose placing the payments into escrow, and will file
suit against the SEC.
Additionally, a clear test for the implementation of section
1103 will allow the SEC to be more effective. Even the SEC is
unclear about what exactly constitutes an "extraordinary pay
ment. "152 This uncertainty leads to unnecessary litigation and work
for the SEC. A straightforward test will allow the SEC to adminis
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § l103(a), 116 Stat.
745, 807-08 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004».
148. Rice, supra note 21, at 3. This does not give the business community a stan
dard they can use to predict whether a payment will be put into escrow. Id. at 4. An
example of this can be seen in the Gemstar case. Before the SEC put Yuen and Leung's
payments into escrow, Gemstar asked the SEC for guidance in regard to the payments.
Id. The SEC was unable to offer any guidance because they were unsure what consti
tuted an "extraordinary payment." Id.
149. Id. at 3. By not objecting to the SEC request to put the payments in escrow,
the corporation can avoid a large expenditure during the investigation. Id.
150. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005)
(majority opinion), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). In fact, Gemstar agreed to freeze
both Yuen and Leung's payments for six months before the SEC applied to put the
payments in escrow under section 1103. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d
1087,1089 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct.
affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005); EMPLOYMENT
COORDINATOR, supra note 102, § 32:10.
151. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1034. Yuen and Leung's severance packages had been
in escrow for six months before the SEC petitioned to place them into escrow pursuant
to section 1103, because Gemstar had voluntarily placed them there at the request of
the SEC. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089; EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 102,
§ 32:10.
152. Rice, supra note 21, at 4.
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ter this section effectively. By allowing for more effective imple
mentation, SOX will have sharper teeth, and, in turn, will help
deter executives from violating securities laws.
Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the dissenting Gemstar
opinions provide guidance for the establishment of a clear and ef
fective test. The test set forth in the majority opinion is unwork
able,153 and the dissenting opinion's definition of "extraordinary
payment" is too narrow and places the burden on the SEC. 154 On
the other hand, the concurring opinion creates a concise and effec
tive test that enforces the purpose of the Act, makes the provision
easy to administer, and helps deter violations of securities law.
B.

The Majority Approach is Ineffective

With Gemstar, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance
and purpose behind section 1103. Unfortunately, the majority
opinion did not create a test that adheres to this purpose, thereby
hindering effective implementation of section 1103. The majority
opinion acknowledged the impact of corporate scandals on investor
confidence. 155 However, after recognizing the importance of this
provision, the majority then set out a "vague and multi-faceted
test" that does not provide effective guidance. 156
First, the majority opinion contradicts the legislative history of
section 1103. 157 Congress's intent was to implement an effective
provision that helps the SEC in preventing a CEO or CFO from
taking "huge bonuses" while their company is being investigated,
153. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting).
154. Rice, supra note 21, at 7. If the SEC is unclear about the definition of an
"extraordinary payment," how is the rest of the business community supposed to know
how to define an "extraordinary payment?" See supra note 148.
155. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1035-36 (majority opinion). The court acknowledged
that before section 1103 was passed, "[b]y the time the authorities hard] been alerted to
the fraud, it [was] too late; the assets of the company hard] already disappeared, render
ing the traditional remedies used by the Commission to rectify such wrongs-disgorge
ment, civil penalties, restitution, etc.-difficult, if not impossible, to pursue." [d. at
1035.
156. [d. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
157. See 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (stating that executives
should not be able to take assets from a corporation when it is under investigation by
the SEC); see also 148 CONGo REc. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (stating that execu
tives should not be able to take assets for their own benefit when they have acted im
properly). Even the majority in Gemstar stated that "the intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to provide a strong shield for third-party creditors and corporate inves
tors once the SEC begins an investigation of corporate malfeasance." Gemstar, 401
F.3d at 1036 (majority opinion). The majority's test does not accomplish this goal.
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leaving investors with nothing. 15s The test the majority opinion cre
ated does not effectively help the SEC reach this goal; instead, it
creates an unworkable test, making it more difficult to prevent
harm to investors. 159
The majority's test sets out factors to help determine whether a
payment is an "extraordinary payment." These factors are: (1) "the
circumstances under which the payment is contemplated or made,"
(2) "the purpose of the payment," and (3) "the size of the pay
ment."160 These factors are sUbjective and are difficult to adminis
ter. 161 In fact, these factors are not even determinative of whether
the payment is "extraordinary," they are only factors that may be
considered when determining whether a payment is "extra
ordinary."162
This vague standard fails to offer any real guidance to the dis
trict courts in deciding whether a payment is an "extraordinary pay
ment." The district courts must wade through each factor, and then
decide which are the most important.1 63 While "[s]tandards that
call for an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances are, of
course, well known to the law,"164 where a less burdensome test
coincides with the legislative intent, the more complex multi-factor
test becomes unnecessary.1 65 Because the concurring opinion pro
158. 148 CONGo REc. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); see Conference Report on
Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
("[W]hile we can't stop greed, we can stop greed from succeeding."); see also supra
note 155.
159. Gemstar,401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1045 (majority opinion).
161. See id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's test
contains complex factors); see also id. at 1051 (stating that the majority opinion is
unworkable).
162. Id. at 1045 (majority opinion).
163. It seems that this was not the intention of Congress when it changed the
standard for the SEC to freeze payments. The pre-SOX standard for freezing payments
involved a multi-factor test. See supra note 72. Under section 1103, Congress allows
the SEC to put payments into escrow, thereby getting rid of the old multi-factor test.
Id. The intention was clearly to make it easier for the SEC to put the payments into
escrow. [d. It does not seem that Congress intended to get rid of one burdensome
multi-factor test just to replace it with another. [d.
164. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1055 (Bea, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("I do not believe however, that
Congress intended courts to apply a vague and multi-faceted test that requires consider
ation of the purpose, circumstances, and size of the benefits, as well as other more
complex factors ...."). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has stated in several cases concerning
police officer stops that "[w]hen courts invoke multi-factor tests, balancing of interests
or fact-specific weighing of circumstances, this introduces a troubling degree of uncer
tainty and unpredictability into the process; no one can be sure whether a particular
combination of factors will justify a stop until a court has ruled on it." United States V.
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vides a less burdensome test, which also effectively implements the
intent behind the legislation, the multi-factor test of the majority is
unnecessary and should be rejected.
Second, the confusion created by the majority opinion does not
end with which factors should be used to evaluate a payment. It
continues with the majority's statement that the payments should
be compared to what a particular company does on a day-to-day
basis, and then suggests comparisons to payments made by other
corporations. 166 The dissenting opinion pointed out the confusion
this could cause in implementing the majority's test: these internal
and external tests could, at times, be in conflict with one another. 167
It is unclear which test, the internal or the external, should be fa
vored in such circumstances. Consequently, the majority did not
create a straightforward test that the SEC will be able to administer
with ease. Instead, the majority's test creates the potential for con
flict and thwarts the effective implementation of section 1103.
Third, the majority inappropriately defined "extraordinary" by
analogy to the "extraordinary expense" cases. The majority opin
ion used the definition of "extraordinary" to support its theory that
the correct test to use is one based on a flexible inquiry.168 The
court defined "extraordinary" to mean "out of the ordinary."169 It
then noted that "out of the ordinary" had been defined before,
when the Ninth Circuit had interpreted "extraordinary ex
penses."170 The "extraordinary expense" cases claim that "exMontero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Montero
Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1142); United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d 943, 947
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1142). While here the court is
dealing with securities law, and not police stops, the multi-factor test invoked still leads
to "uncertainty and unpredictability." While in the above cases the court did not use a
strict bright-line approach, it did recognize that only the most relevant factors should be
used. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d at 947 (citing Arvizu, 232 F.3d at 1248; Montero
Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132). In this case, getting rid of the "uncertainty and unpredict
ability" can easily be done by declaring every severance payment an "extraordinary
payment," instead of forcing the courts to litigate the question in each instance. See
Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L.
REV. 1129, 1183 (2001) ("Multi-factor tests, applied case by case, make litigation the
only venue for defining the scope of permissible use.").
166. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045 (majority opinion).
167. Jd. at 1055 (Bea, J., dissenting).
168. Jd.
169. [d. at 1045 (majority opinion).
170. Jd. at 1045 n.2; see also Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105, 108 (9th Cir.
1996); Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1994); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local
Union No. 137, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1365 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980).
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traordinary" means expenses not part of the day-to-day running of
the business. l71 The Gemstar majority used these cases to deter
mine that "extraordinary" meant the same thing in this instance. l72
However, there are two problems with the Gemstar majority's in
terpretation of these earlier cases.
To begin with, severance packages paid to high-level employ
ees are not "business as usual."173 Therefore, such payments are
never going to be "normal to its business operation."174 Also, there
is no correlation between the definition of "extraordinary" that the
court used and the multi-factor test that the court then imple
mented. Nowhere in any of the "extraordinary expense" cases did
the court use a multi-factor test to decide if an expense was an "ex
traordinary" onePS In Gemstar, the majority provided no explana
tion as to why it jumped from the definition of "extraordinary" to
deciding that a multi-factor test was necessary.176 Consequently,
the court's reliance on a multi-factor test was misplaced.
While the majority's opinion is a "middle ground"l77 between
171. Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77; Frito-Lay, Inc.,
623 F.2d at 1365 n.l1.
172. Gemstar,401 F.3d at 1045 n.2.
173. Id. at 1046.
174. Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365 n.l1. Examples of this can be seen in the
severance packages of several CEOs. If fired, the CEO of Clear Channel Communica
tions would receive a severance package worth $28 million. Gordon T. Anderson, Want
a Big Payday? Get Fired: If You're a Captain of Industry, the Day you Leave Might be
the Most Profitable of All, CNN MONEY, Apr. 30, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/04/
29/pf/investinglceo_severance/index.htm. The CEO of Home Depot recently received
"an exit package valued at about $210 million, including $20 million in cash severance."
Joann S. Lublin et aI., Moving Out: Behind Nardelli's Abrupt Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2007, at AI. These payments are not part of the day-to-day management of businesses.
Therefore, according to the definition of "ordinary" in the "extraordinary expenses"
cases, severance packages will always be "extraordinary."
175. See generally Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d 105; Sousa, 32 F.3d 1370; Frito-Lay,
Inc., 623 F.2d 1354. In all of the "extraordinary expense" cases, the court looked only
at whether the expenses were part of the day-to-day running of the business. Atlanta
One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77; Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365.
The courts adopted a bright-line rule: if the expenses were part of the day-to-day run
ning of the business they were "ordinary expenses," and if not, then they were "ex
traordinaryexpenses." Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77;
Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365. Using the definition of "extraordinary" in these cases
would support the notion that severance packages given to executives are not part of
the daily running of a business; therefore, they will always be "extraordinary."
176. In fact, all the court stated was that "[t]he standard of comparison is the
company's common or regular behavior. Thus, the determination of whether a pay
ment is extraordinary will be a fact-based and flexible inquiry." Gemstar, 401 F.3d at
1045 (emphasis added).
177. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 896.
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the concurring and dissenting opinions, this alone is not a sufficient
reason to use its test to interpret "extraordinary payments." Propo
nents of the majority's test state that it is "[a] flexible, multi-factor
test [that] will allow the SEC to obtain a freeze where the circum
stances surrounding the company under investigation indicate that
investors would not otherwise be able to protect themselves."178
However, the reality is that the test may cause confusion and does
not provide clear guidance to the SEC or the courts. Consequently,
the majority's test is "unworkable,"179 and will not be effective in
enforcing securities law.
C.

The Dissenting Approach is Too Narrow and Burdensome

The dissent's test for "extraordinary payments" is a narrow test
that places the burden directly on the SEC, which is contrary to the
intent of Congress.1 80 The legislative intent in passing this provi
sion was to make it more difficult for executives to take money
from a corporation while it is under investigation by the SEC;181
however, the dissent's test does not meet this objective.1 82 The crux
of the dissent's test is whether similar companies, which have not
been investigated by the SEC, have made similar payments. 183 This
test is too narrow, and it undercuts the purpose of the Act.
The dissent's test thwarts the effective implementation of sec
tion 1103 just as the majority's test does. The dissent set out five
178. Id.
179. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting).
180. Rice, supra note 21, at 2.
181. 148 CONGo REc. H4685 (daily ed. July 16,2002) (statement of Rep. Sensen
brenner) (explaining that the bill would make it much more difficult for executives to
"pilfer" from companies under investigation); 148 CONGo REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10,
2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (describing the escrow provisions). This is apparent
when one looks at the change in the SEC's freeze authority from the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See supra note 72. The standard was much
harder to meet under the 1934 Act, and included several factors. Id.
182. The dissent's test "fails to focus on why a freeze is necessary in the first
place," that is, to stop executives from taking assets from the corporation when the SEC
is investigating corporate wrongdoing. Rice, supra note 21, at 8. If the dissent's test
were put into practice, there would be little change from before SOX was implemented.
Executives gUilty of corporate wrongdoing would still get big severance packages, and
the investors would be left with nothing. In fact, before the court's en banc decision,
writers for the Washington Legal Foundation wrote: "By granting en banc review, the
Ninth Circuit has temporarily prevented section 1103 from being rendered a virtual
nullity." Michael R. Sklaire & Steven M. Goldsobel, Federal Court Ruling will Impact
SEC's Ability to Freeze Assets Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Wash. Legal Found. (Jan. 28,
2005), available at http://www.wcsr.com/downloads/pdfs/sox012805.pdf.
183. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051.

256

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:231

factors to be considered when comparing a severance payment to
payments made by similar companies. 184 The factors include: (1)
the size of the company, (2) the type of market, (3) the employee's
title, (4) how long the employee worked at the company, and (5)
why the employee was terminated. I85 While these factors make it
more likely that a severance package would be placed in escrow,
their effectiveness is misleading because the factors require a com
parison to companies not under investigation by the SEC. 186
In addition, and more importantly, one of the purposes of sec
tion 1103 is to stop corporate executives from taking money that
should go towards compensating investors. 187 It is hardly appropri
ate to compare executives under investigation for violating securi
ties law to executives complying with the law because "[m]ost
corporate executives and board members of this country work very
hard, very diligently and in the highest professional manner to per
form their function. This [Act] is centered at those people that re
ally do believe that greed is goOd."188 The intent of the legislature
184. Id. at 1056.
185. !d. By comparing the "extraordinary payments" of companies under investi
gation by the SEC to companies not under investigation by the SEC, the dissenting
judge misinterpreted the purpose of the statute. While the first two factors proposed by
the judge, the size of the company and the type of market, give some guidance as to
what a "comparable" company is, they do not provide a finite standard for the district
courts and the SEC to use. See id.
186. During 2002 and 2003, "the average severance package at an S&P 500 com
pany amounted to $16.5 million." Anderson, supra note 174. These numbers would be
measuring sticks for whether a severance package is an "extraordinary payment." Also,
because of the recent corporate scandals, severance packages are not going "to deviate
from the 'habits and customs of the marketplace,''' and therefore, according to the dis
sent's test, most severance packages will not be placed into escrow by the SEC, even
though they are "extraordinary." Rice, supra note 21, at 7. Based on these factors, to
put a payment into escrow, the SEC would have "to conduct a full-blown evidentiary
hearing." Sklaire & Goldsobel, supra note 182, at 2. It is possible that the hearing
could simply become "a battle of experts." Id. This would make it a "question [of] ...
whether the SEC would choose to derail its investigation of corporate fraud to devote
the resources necessary to prevail in a section 1103 proceeding." Id.
187. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
188. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35
(statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski). Hollywood has stereotyped the corporate execu
tive as greedy. This can be seen through Michael Douglas's character, Gordon Gecko,
in the movie Wall Street:
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed-for a lack of a better word-is
good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and cap
tures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms-greed
for life, for money, for love, knowledge-has marked the upward surge of
mankind. And greed-you mark my words-will not only save Teldar Paper,
but that other malfunctioning corporation called the USA.
WALL STREET (Warner Bros. 1987). Rep. Kanjorski was suggesting that SOX is essen
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was to punish corporate wrongdoers, not to compare suspected
wrongdoers to innocent CEOs when deciding if the suspected
wrongdoers should have their payments put into escrow. 189
The dissent's test is therefore too narrow and impedes the ef
fectiveness of section 1103. The dissent's test would allow many
"extraordinary payments" to escape the authority of the SEC.
Also, the standard the dissenting judge sets-comparing companies
not under investigation by the SEC with those actually under inves
tigation-evades the purpose of the Act. Consequently, the dis
sent's interpretation of "extraordinary payments" is not the most
effective test to use.
D.

The Concurring Approach is the Most Effective Test for
Evaluating "Extraordinary Payments"

Declaring all severance packages to be "extraordinary pay
ments," creates a bright-line rule, making it easy for the SEC to
administer section 1103 in regard to severance packages. The dis
cussion above suggests that both the majority opinion and the dis
senting opinion provide ineffective tests, leading to more litigation
than is necessary.190 While there are some weaknesses in the con
curring opinion's test, it furthers the purpose of the Act, is easy for
the SEC to administer, and is therefore the most effective means of
deterring executives from taking payments after they have deceived
investors.
The concurring judge, like the majority, uses the definition of
"extraordinary" to support his position;191 however, he does not
follow up this definition with a vague "multi-faceted test."192 As
Judge Reinhardt states, "the payment of benefits related to that
severance, is, by definition, 'extraordinary': it is uncommon, unu
sual, and, ultimately, not a part of the regular day-to-day business
tially focused on the Gordon Geckos of the world, and not the majority of corporate
executives who are hard-working individuals who do not believe greed is good. Confer
ence Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Rep.
Paul Kanjorski).
189. See 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (implying that once a
company is under investigation by the SEC, a CEO's "pay and benefits" will be frozen
automatically). Congress intended to focus on wrongdoers, not innocent CEOs, and
therefore, the standard should focus on people not following the Act. See supra note
188 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Congress intended for the Act to be
focused on greedy people).
190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
191. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1049 (Reinhart, J.,
concurring).
192. [d.
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of the company."193 Judge Reinhardt took the majority opinion
and cut out all of the unnecessary factors and analysis to suggest
that severance payments are never going to be "part of the day-to
day operations of the enterprise. "194 The resulting bright-line rule
will help to effectively implement the underlying purpose of the
Act, will be easy for the SEC to administer, and will therefore help
deter potential violators of securities regulations.
1.

The Concurring Opinion Helps to Effectively Implement
the Purpose of the Act

The concurring opinion advocated its interpretation of section
1103 with the purpose of SOX in mind. 195 While the majority opin
ion cited to the legislative history, that history was not used to cre
ate an effective test,196 The Congressional Record clearly states
that the purpose behind this section is to prevent executives from
receiving large sums of money while the SEC is investigating their
company.197 The majority interpreted this to mean that they should
adopt a test with different factors, placing the burden on the SEC to
justify freezing the payments. However, as the concurring opinion
noted, "Congress did not intend that before the SEC may freeze a
severance payment ... it must satisfy the 'extraordinariness' stan
dard by presenting a substantial body of evidence to a court regard
ing the purpose, circumstances, and size of that particular
payment."198 By putting all severance payments into escrow, the
SEC will be able to effectively stop executives from escaping with
193. Id. The three "extraordinary expenses" cases used by both the majority and
the dissent support the concurring opinion's position that "extraordinary" means some
thing that is not part of the day-to-day business. See Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d
105,107-08 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "extraordinary" means something that does not
happen in the day-to-day business of a company); Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370, 1376
77 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, Int'I Bhd. of Team
sters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1365 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
194. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1050.
195. For a discussion of the purpose of section 1103, see supra notes 69-80 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 156-57.
197. 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); 148 CONGo REC. S6545
(daily ed. July 10, 2002).
198. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051; see 145 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16,
2002) ("Under this legislation, top executives will not be allowed to pilfer the assets of
the company by giving themselves huge bonuses and other extraordinary payments if
the company is subject to an SEC investigation.") (emphasis added); see also 148 CONGo
REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (stating that adding the "extraordinary payment"
provision would strengthen the bill, and fix some of the loopholes in the law).
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huge severance packages, ensuring the return of funds to investors
who have been harmed. 199
2.

The Concurring Opinion's Test is Easy for the SEC to
Administer

Creating an easy-to-administer standard will allow the SEC to
be more effective in carrying out the Act.200 Before SOX was
passed, the SEC could not get a court order to escrow payments
until they had formally filed charges against a company.201 The
SEC had to satisfy a heavy burden in order to freeze assets.202 They
had to "demonstrate that the underlying claim [was] meritorious
and that a legitimate concern exist[ed] that absent a freeze, the as
sets sought to be frozen [WOUld] be dissipated."203 Section 1103 was
intended to take the burden off the SEC. 204
199. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 893; see also Rice, supra note 21, at 5 (stating that
the standard should be created with the prevention of harm to the investors in mind).
Also, giving high severance packages suggests that the board of directors has no control
over their shareholders' funds. Michael Brush, You're Fired. Here's Your $16 Million,
MSN MONEY, Apr. 9, 2003, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/p44954.asp. Brush
also points out that many companies that have given large severance packages also have
stock values that have dropped in the last few years. 1d. Brush states that the sever
ance packages given to the Gemstar executives were "fairly typical." Jd. Allowing the
SEC to put all severance packages into escrow will help offset worries by investors that
the CEO and the CFO of the corporation are calling the shots, and the board of direc
tors does not have any power. The concurring opinion's test allows the SEC to "aggres
sively pursue" executives under investigation and return funds taken from executives to
the investors. See Bilodeau, supra note 69. One of the purposes of the act was to allow
the SEC to seek out executives who committed wrongful acts. Jd.
200. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note
35 (statement of Rep. Richard Shelby) (stating that "[t]o be effective, we must ensure
that this legislation is properly implemented"). Bright-line rules often create a clear
rule that does not result in arbitrary enforcement. See White House Vigil for the ERA
Comm'n v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1541 n.145 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the court's
ruling "[m]ost importantly ... establishes a clear, bright line rule that does not lend
itself to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement"); see also Osterneck v. Ernst & Whin
ney, 489 U.S. 169, 176 n.3 (1989) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486
U.S. 196,200 (1988)) (stating that "[c]ourts and litigants are best served by the bright
line rule, which accords with traditional understanding"). While there are some critics
of bright-line rules in securities law who feel bright-line rules "can be used by the clever
and dishonest," this is not the case here. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d
1337,1343 (S.D. Fla. 2004), affd, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). By creating this bright
line rule, the court would be creating a narrowly tailored rule that would place into
escrow a particular type of payment, providing compensation for wronged investors.
Also, bright-line rules are not foreign to securities law. See infra note 206.
201. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 88l.
202. Rice, supra note 21, at 2.
203.

Jd.

204.

The dissent's approach would put the burden back on the SEC. Jd.
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Under SOX, the SEC only needs to show "that it 'appears to
the commission' that an 'extraordinary payment' is likely to be
made to an issuer."205 This language makes it clear that section
1103 was passed to make it easier for the SEC to put payments into
escrow. The concurring opinion's test does just this. It does not
burden the SEC with a multi-factor test. It is a straightforward,
bright-line rule that is simple for the SEC to apply.206
The SEC admitted before the Gemstar case that it "was unsure
what constituted extraordinary payments. "207 For this reason, the
SEC was unable to give Gemstar guidance regarding whether the
severance packages would be put into escrow.208 This is not an ef
fective way to implement this provision. 209 This uncertainty does
not allow the SEC to pursue a payment freeze without wondering
whether its investigation will be delayed by the need to litigate over
205. /d. at 3 (quoting 15 u.s.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004».
206. Bright-line rules are not foreign to securities law. For example, the courts
have consistently held that Congress intended to implement a bright-line rule when it
passed section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. 15 U.S.c. § 78p(b)
(2000). Section 16(b) "contains a blanket prohibition on insiders engaging in short
swing trades-purchasing and selling (or vice versa) within a six-month window." Drei
ling v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing 15 U.S.c.
§ 78p(b». The courts have consistently held that, with respect to this provision, Con
gress intended to pass a bright-line rule. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pe
troleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595 (1973); Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 941 F.2d 933,
944 (9th Cir. 1991), amended on other grounds, 951 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991); Arrow
Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Segen ex reI. KFx
Inc. v. Westcliff Capital Mgmt., 299 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Dreiling, 281
F. Supp. 2d at 1219. The courts have ruled that the intention of Congress is clear, and
that section 16(b) should be implemented by a bright-line rule. Similarly, here Con
gress clearly intended that section 1103 give back to investors who have been wronged,
and this is exactly what a bright-line rule would do.
207. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. This would not happen if a bright-line rule was
created. Bright-line rules are known for their certainty, and:
[I]f private actors can know in advance the incidence of official intervention,
they will adjust their activities in advance to take account of them. From the
point of view of the state, this increases the likelihood that private activity will
follow a desired pattern. From the point of view of the citizenry, it removes
the inhibiting effect on action that occurs when one's gains are subject to spo
radic legal catastrophe.
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1685, 1688-89 (1975-76).
208. Rice, supra note 21, at 4.
209. A bright-line rule would be an effective way to implement this provision.
See supra note 200 (summarizing that bright-line rules often lead to non-arbitrary en
forcement). This is further supported by the fact that "bright-line rules have grown
increasingly important in corporate law over the course of this century." Matthew G.
Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle
Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 773 (1997).
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whether a payment is "extraordinary."210 The test proposed in the
concurring opinion would give the SEC a clear and definitive rule
as to when it can put an executive's severance package into
escrow.2lt
3.

The Concurring Opinion's Test Will Help Deter
Violations of Securities Law

The test set out in the concurring opinion will also help deter
potential violations of SOx. Severance packages paid to executives
in America are so high that in some instances it may be more profit
able for executives to get fired than to keep their jobS. 212 This does
not encourage executives to follow the corporate governance rules
within SOX. If the worst-case scenario for these executives is a vio
lation of securities law that results in a severance package worth
more than they would have received if they had stayed with the
company, then there is less incentive to comply with securities law.
Section 1103 aids the SEC in enforcing other provisions within
SOX. Therefore, it is important to apply an easily enforceable test
to section 1103 to increase overall deterrence of securities law viola
tions. 213 For example, the executive bar provision of SOX allows
the SEC to bar an officer from serving on a board of directors if the
.SEC finds that he or she is unfit.214 If it is more profitable for a
CEO to be fired than to keep his job, the executive bar provision
becomes meaningless. When an executive receives a huge sever
ance package after violating securities law, it may not be important
to that executive that she has been barred from serving on a board
of directors, because after the large severance package, she may not
have to work at all in order to maintain her existing lifestyle.
The standard used to enforce section 1103 could also have an
210. Also, this does not help companies determine which payments they give to
their officers will be put into escrow.
211. See supra note 200 (discussing the clarity of bright-line rules); see also Kath
leen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
62 (1992) ("[R]ules afford certainty and predictability to private actors, enabling them
to order their affairs productively. Standards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling so
cially productive behavior."). A bright-line rule would also reduce any arbitrariness or
bias and require consistent action. See id. (stating the arguments for rules).
212. Russ Banham, Pay in the Balance-Severance Packages, THE CHIEF EXECU
TIVE (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4070/is_2001_
Augusta/ai_78805390.
213. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note
35 (statement of Rep. Richard Shelby) ("[P]assing [SOX] is not enough .... To be
effective, we must ensure that this legislation is properly implemented.").
214. Androphy & Graham, supra note 18, at 67.
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effect on the code-of-ethics provision of SOX. The code-of-ethics
provision encourages corporations to adopt ethics rules that would
address conflict of interest scenarios and encourage full disclosure
of SEC filings. 215 The goal of the code-of-ethics section is to pro
mote "honest and ethical" conduct.2 16 However, because compa
nies can tailor their codes in any way they choose, this provision has
come under criticism for being ineffective.2 17 The fear of losing a
hefty severance package may encourage CEOs and CFOs to live up
to the desired standard of "honest and ethical" conduct, which
would compensate for the lack of deterrence within the code-of
ethics provision itself.
Also, having a strict punishment provision in SOX may help
offset other weaknesses within the Act, including those found in the
signatory requirements for CEOs and CFOs. The signatory re
quirements mandate that CEOs and CFOs certify corporate finan
cial information.218 While this was supposed to give the Act
sharper "teeth,"219 critics state that this provision will not stop exec
utives from lying on SEC filings. 22o However, strict application of
section 1103 will serve as a strong incentive for executive honesty.
While it is true that this bright-line approach may make finding
CEOs to run corporations more difficult, this would only apply to
executives who might be guilty of wrongdoing. Since the passage of
SOX, it has become increasingly difficult for corporations to find
qualified candidates to fill executive positions. 221 CEO candidates
are hesitant to risk liability, and the risk of losing a severance pack
age makes candidates even less willing to apply for these jobs.222
However, this only will affect executives not fit to serve as officers;
therefore, if the executive is careful and complies with securities
law, then she has little to worry about. 223 Although the bright-line
test can be harsh, and may result in the freezing of legitimate sever
ance payments, it is also the most effective test. The concurring
215. HAZEN 5th ed., supra note 56.
216. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
217. Note, The Good, the Bad, and their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2123, 2134-36 (2003).
218. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30.
219. Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 152.
220. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32.
221. Bilodeau, supra note 69.
222. Berg, supra note 58, at 1901.
223. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note
35 (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski) (stating the Act's purpose "is centered around
people that believe that greed is good").
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opinion's test is a straightforward, easy to administer test that helps
the SEC reach its goal and increases investor confidence by al
lowing the SEC to effectively return funds to investors when there
has been corporate misgovernance.
In any event, "innocent" severance packages put into escrow
will be returned if there was no wrongdoing. Furthermore, the SEC
has the discretion to not place seemingly "innocent" or "ordinary"
payments in escrow.224 As the concurring opinion stated, the SEC
"will undoubtedly consider whether, on the basis of the limited
facts available to it, a particular freeze order is necessary or desira
ble to protect the public interest."225 Although it is true that some
"innocent" payments may be put into escrow, these payments will
be returned after the escrow period.
The concurring opinion's bright-line rule will make wrongdo
ing executives fear the consequences of violating securities law.
Having a simple test might help to deter corporate officers from
breaking the law, and could set higher deterrence standards for the
rest of the Act. Creating a strong bright-line rule to implement sec
tion 1103 will create a more powerful and effective SEC. Conse
quently, this will help to effectively implement other provisions of
the Act.
CONCLUSION

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act arose out of the corporate scandals of
the 1990s with the goal of restoring investor confidence in the mar
kets.226 The investors of the 1990s differed from the investors of
the past. 227 These newer investors were middle class Americans
saving for their children's college educations and their own retire
ment. 228 The purpose of SOX was to encourage these investors to
start investing in stocks again after many of them had lost money in
the wake of corporate scandals. 229 In order to get these investors
back into the market, a much stronger SEC needed to be created,
an SEC with the power to punish corporate wrongdoers.
224. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'!, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cerro denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005).
225. Jd.
226. Glassman, supra note 33.
227. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339 (citing an increase in households with
investments).
228. See id. (stating that the stock markets are now an important part of many
Americans' financial planning).
229. See Glassman, supra note 33; Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40 (implying that
the purpose behind SOX was to create investor confidence in the market).
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This is why the concurring opinion's test in Gemstar, a bright
line rule where all severance packages are considered "extraordi
nary payments," is the test that should be adopted. This test helps
to give section 1103 and the SEC a provision that can easily and
effectively compensate wronged investors.
Also, by implementing this bright-line rule, the SEC can easily
administer section 1103. The SEC will no longer have to guess
whether a certain severance package fits into the category of "ex
traordinary payment," cutting down on litigation time and costS.230
This will allow the SEC to focus more time on the investigation
rather than on securing the funds to compensate investors if wrong
doing is found. 231
Furthermore, this rule will encourage potential wrongdoers to
follow the requirements of SOX. The severance packages of many
CEOs and CFOs are high. In some cases it is more profitable for
these executives to leave the company than to continue working. 232
However, if the SEC can put all severance packages into escrow,
then following corporate rules might become more appealing to
these executives. Consequently, this will help deter executives from
violating securities law in the first instance, and could possibly
strengthen the SEC and other provisions within SOX.
Finally, this straightforward, bright-line test is more effective
for furthering the intent of the legislature and the purpose of SOX.
This test will allow the SEC to crack down on corporate wrongdo
ers, avoid future corporate scandals, and help investors regain and
maintain confidence in the financial markets.
Christine J. Unger*

230. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. This could also work the same way for
corporations.
231. See Sklaire & Goldsobel, supra note 182.
232. See Anderson, supra note 174 (citing severance packages that range from
$9.4 million to $82 million); Banham, supra note 212 (stating that it might be more
profitable for some executives to get fired rather than keep their jobs).
* Thank you to the editors of the Western New England Law Review and to my
family for all of their support.

